Domestic Relations -- Evidence -- Testimony by One Spouse against the Other of Adultery Excluded under North Carolina Law by Davis, James Lee
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 48 | Number 1 Article 17
12-1-1969
Domestic Relations -- Evidence -- Testimony by
One Spouse against the Other of Adultery
Excluded under North Carolina Law
James Lee Davis
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
James L. Davis, Domestic Relations -- Evidence -- Testimony by One Spouse against the Other of Adultery Excluded under North Carolina
Law, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 131 (1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol48/iss1/17
TESTIMONY OF SPOUSE IN DIVORCE ACTION
arrested earlier, why would he not be entitled to have excluded from use
against him any evidence acquired by the state during the delay? Taken
to its logical conclusion, such a new interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment leads to an illogical result because the right to a speedy trial as a
shield for the defendant's protection will have become a sword for his
escape.5
2
By extending the right to a speedy trial to the period before indict-
ment, the North Carolina court has opened "a Pandora's box of nice
distinctions" :53 problems of proof, the precise point at which the right
attaches, and the possibility of an exclusionary rule. But at least North
Carolina has faced the problem of the potential defendant's right to a
speedy trial. Other courts have availed themselves of the protective .cloak
provided by statutes of limitations 4 to avoid resolution of this problem.
Such a cloak will have to be shed in the future, for a statute of limitations
merely puts a maximum limit on the time for indictment; only the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial can put the minimum limit on it.
North Carolina, in this area among the legal pioneers, has taken its first,
and therefore the most difficult, step in recognizing that a potential de-
fendant has, just as a defendant already under indictment, a basic right to
a speedy trial.
JOAN G. BRANNON
Domestic Relations-Evidence-Testimony by One Spouse against the
Other of Adultery Excluded under North Carolina Law
At common law neither husband nor wife was a competent witness
in any action to which the other spouse was a party.' Except in crim-
inal cases, this rule of disqualification has been largely overturned by
statute or by judicial decision in American jurisdiction's.2 In North Caro-
12 State v. Patton, 260 N.C. 359, 364, 132 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1969); Note, The
Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 853 (1957).
" Lagging Right to Speedy Trial 1617.
" See generally Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Pene-
trable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1954).
" C. M CORMIICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; D. STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 58 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANSBURY].
'Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against The Other in Criminal
Cases Where The Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications:
Modern Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359-60 (1952). Both husband and wife are fully
competent to testify either for or against their respective spouses in civil cases in
the majority of jurisdictions. MCCORMICK § 66.
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lina husband and wife are generally "competent and compellable to give
evidence, as any other witness on behalf of any party" in a civil action.3
The purpose of this section, North Carolina General Statutes § 8-56
(1953), is to abrogate the common law disability in civil actions and to
list the exceptions thereto. One exception is that neither spouse is com-
petent to testify "for or against the other in any action or proceeding in
consequence of adultery, or in any action or proceeding for divorce on
account of adultery."4
Though worded differently, a similar exception is found in North
Carolina General Statutes § 50-10 (1966)
The material facts in every complaint asking for a divorce shall
be deemed to be denied by the defendant, whether the same shall be
actually denied by pleading or not, and no judgment shall be given in
favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until such facts have been
found by a jury, and on such trial neither the husband nor wife shall be
a competent witness to prove the adultery of the other, nor shall the ad-
missions of either party be received as evidence to prove such fact ....
It is significant that this provision in Chapter 50, Divorce and Alimony,
is cross referenced to section 8-56 and that these statutes are often con-
sidered together.'
The proper application of these statutory rules of evidence was ques-
tioned recently in Hicks v. Hicks.7 The plaintiff husband sued for absolute
divorce on the grounds of a one-year separation.$ The defendant wife
answered by denying plaintiff's allegations. Alleging abandonment and
indignities on the part of the plaintiff, she sought temporary alimony and
alimony without divorce by cross action.' Plaintiff replied denying her
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-56 (1953).
'Id. The other exceptions are not material to this note.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1966) (emphasis added).
E.g., 1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAw § 65 (3d ed. 1963) [herein-
after cited as LEE].
'275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969).
' The plaintiff also alleged his wife's adultery; however, he was nonsuited on
this cause of action.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (1966), providing for alimony without divorce, was
repealed by the 1967 General Assembly. Ch. 1152, § 1 & ch. 1153, § 1 [1967] N.C.
Sess. L. 1766, 1772. Mrs. Hicks had filed her cross action prior to Oct. 1, 1967,
the effective date of repeal, and the court held that she had proceeded pursuant to
this section. 275 N.C. at 373, 167 S.E.2d at 762-63. The court also held that an
action for alimony without divorce under section 50-16 was a divorce action within
the purview of that portion of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1966) that prohibits the
husband or wife from testifying to prove adultery of the opposing spouse. Id. at
375, 167 S.E.2d at 764.
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allegations and asserting defendant's adultery as a bar to them 10 and as
justification of his separation from her.
At trial the plaintiff offered testimony of his wife's adultery both as
recrimination" to her cross action and as rebuttal to her defense of
willful abandonment. If allowed to testify, the plaintiff would have stated
that on January 8, 1964, he returned home and discovered his wife
engaged in an act of adultery.' 2 The trial court ruled that this evidence
was excluded by statute.'3 The record does not indicate upon which statute
the trial court was relying nor does it include any judicial interpretation
of either pertinent statute.
The court of appeals reversed,' 4 reasoning:
At the time the challenged testimony was offered, plaintiff's action
for divorce on the grounds of adultery had been dismissed; Therefore,
it was not offered "in any action or proceeding for divorce on account
of adultery" as forbidden by G.S. 8-56. For the same reason, the pro-
hibition set forth in G.S. 50-10 was not applicable because a divorce
action grounded on adultery was not being tried at the time.'Y
The remainder of the court's opinion is concerned chiefly with whether the
challenged testimony offended that portion of section 8-56 barring spousal
testimony "in any action or proceeding in consequence of adultery." Hence,
for all practical purposes, the court of appeals dismissed section 50-10
with only a sentence. In arriving at the conclusion that the testimony did
1* N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (1966) in part provided "that in all applications for
a!imony under this section it shall be competent for the husband to plead the
adultery of the wife in bar of her right to such alimony . .. ."
" The doctrine of recrimination provides, in effect, that "if both parties have
a right to a divorce, neither of the parties has." 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 67 (1959).
The court in Hicks considered the plaintiff's plea in bar as provided for in section
50-16 as a defense of recrimination, though the defendant was asking for alimony
without divorce.
Recrimination has often been criticized and many jurisdictions have limited its
application. It is not the purpose of this note to analyze the validity of the doc-
trine. However, for a thorough discussion of recrimination and its applicability to
modern society, see Moore, Recrimination: An Examination of the Recrimination
Doctrine, 20 S.C.L. REv. 685 (1968). It has been observed that this doctrine
tends to breed collusion. 24 A~m. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 226 (1966).
Thus, recrimination appears to be in direct conflict with the legislative intent of
N.C. GE-N-. STAT. § 8-56 (1953) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10 (1966). See note 22
infra.
" Brief for Appellant at 6, Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681
(1969).
" Record at 56, Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681 (1969).
"' Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681 (1969).
'r Id. at 32, 165 S.E.2d at 683.
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not offend section 8-56, the court of appeals explored the former North
Carolina case law on the subject and emphasized that the purpose of the
statute is to prevent collusive divorces.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed,'" although it agreed
that section 8-56 was not controlling for the reasons given by the court
of appeals I However, the court distinguished section 50-10 from section
8-56 on the basis that:
The provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-10 are not limited to "any
action or proceeding for divorce on account of adultery" or "actions or
proceedings in consequence of adultery," but includes "every complaint
asking for a divorce.""'
The court relied heavily upon the statement of Justice Ruffin in Perkins
v. Perkins :"9
The provision of the statute is so pointed and its language so plain-
that in such trials, neither the husband nor the wife shall be a com-
petent witness to prove the adultery of the other, nor shall the admis-
sions of either be received as evidence to prove such fact-as to leave no
room for doubt or construction.2 0
However, Perkins needs to be explored only to the next sentence of
that opinion for an authoritative statement of the legislative intent behind
the statute:
This prohibition, as has been often said by the court, proceeds out
of'. . . that interest which society has at stake in the preservation of
the marriage relations of its members, . . .and it is the duty of the
courts to see that neither this policy of the law nor public interest is
impaired through the collusion of the parties, and in fact that it shall
not even encounter the risk of being so impaired: for . . . this policy
of excluding the admissions of the parties depends, not so much upon
the ground that there is collusion between them, as upon the danger
that there may be.2 1
"
8Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969).
11Id. at 374, 167 S.E.2d at 763.
1 Id. at 378, 167 S.E.2d at 766.
1988 N.C. 41 (1883).
20 Id. at 43, quoted in Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 378, 167 S.E.2d 761, 766
(1969). The court in Hicks pointed out that Justice Ruffin in Perkins was inter-
preting what is now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-10.
"1 88 N.C. at 43 (emphasis added).
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In Perkins the husband's divorce action on the grounds of adultery was
pending at the time he proposed to testify that his wife had admitted to
him her commission of an act of adultery. Thus, there existed a possi-
bility of collusive divorce on those grounds. In the words of Justice
Ruffin:
It is impossible to conceive of a case more certainly coming within
the mischief of the statute than the present, or one in which its enforce-
ment could be more necessary, because of the opportunity for collusion
afforded by the very nature of the accusation and the length of the time
since the offence is said to have occurred.22
In a collusive divorce the parties are working together through a
corrupt agreement toward a common goal of divorce.' The collusion
may consist of "(1) the commission of an offense for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, or (2) the introduction of false evidence of an
offense not actually committed, or (3) the suppression of a valid de-
fense."'24 In any instance, the objective of collusion is divorce by mutual
consent. 5 In such a case, the court, which is an interested party in
every divorce action because of society's high regard for the marital rela-
tionship,28 must assume the role of adversary, "probe for . . . collusion
and deny a divorce if [it] seems to be present." 27
"Id. at 44 (emphasis added). For further authority that "[t]hese statutes
are designed not only to prevent collusion where the same exists, but to remove
the opportunity for it," see 1 LEE § 65, at 265. See Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10,
16, 116 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1960) ; Hooper v. Hooper, 165 N.C. 605, 608, 81 S.E. 933,
934 (1914) ; STANSnURY § 58.
An argument may be found in Broom v. Broom, 130 N.C. 562, 564, 41 S.E. 673,
674 (1902), that "in view of the strong feeling incident to contested divorce pro-
ceedings," a further purpose of the statutes is to prevent perjury. The possibility
of perjury may be great in all contested divorce proceedings and does not appear
to warrant a disqualification statute in the area of adultery alone. The argument
in Broom has not been cited in recent opinions nor by the scholars in the field.
1 LE § 85.
Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36
CoLum. L. REv. 1121, 1122-23 (1936).
" Divorce is not to be granted upon mutual consent of the parties alone. Id. at
1121. N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-6 (1966), which allows divorce after a voluntary
separation for a period of one year, is an indication of a breakdown in the historical
requisite of fault before divorce. Approximately ninety-seven percent of divorces
in North Carolina are granted under this statute. 1 LEE § 68. This change in
policy in both North Carolina and other jurisdictions may foreshadow adoption of
divorce by mutual consent. The thrust of such legislation would definitely mitigate
the mandate against collusive divorces. Interestingly enough, though the court
warns constantly of the danger of such divorces, a divorce has never been refused
in North Carolina on the basis of collusion. Id. § 85.
" 1 LEE § 85.
2"' d.
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As reaffirmed in the supreme court's opinion, North Carolina recognizes
the doctrine of recrimination 2 -- a common law rule that bars the moving
party's right to divorce (or, as interpreted in Hicks, alimony without
divorce) 29 if it is proved that the moving party has himself been guilty of
misconduct that would entitle the opposing spouse to a divorce.30 Though
offered in this context-to bar his wife's cross action for alimony without
divorce-the husband's testimony was excluded as incompetent under
section 50-10, a statute drafted to prevent collusion. Where one spouse
pleads recrimination, however, the relationship of the parties is different
from their relationship in a collusive proceeding. Successful recrimina-
tion precludes divorce, thereby frustrating the ultimate result of success-
ful collusion.
Where such a plea is offered as a bar to the moving spouse's action,
there is a true adversary proceeding. The parties, rather than being
allied, are opposing one another; and the integrity of the court is not in
jeopardy through collusion. Furthermore, it is quite doubtful that a
husband would ever collude in his wife's action for alimony without divorce
or that society is greatly concerned in a proceeding where the marital bond
is not to be severed completely. Allowing the husband to testify to his
wife's adultery in this instance would in no way offend the purpose of the
statute.
The challenged testimony was also offered to justify the husband's
leaving his wife. In this regard, such testimony would serve two pur-
poses. First, it would be invaluable as a defense to his wife's cross action
on grounds of abandonment. One issue presented to the jury was whether
the plaintiff had unlawfully abandoned his wife "without adequate provoca-
tion."31 Certainly, if the husband's contentions were believed by the
jury, it should not have been answered in the affirmative.3 2
In addition, the testimony would have been beneficial to the husband's
action for divorce on the basis of a one-year separation. The plaintiff
would normally have been entitled to divorce upon a finding by the jury
that the plaintiff and defendant had lived separate and apart within the
meaning of North Carolina General Statutes § 50-6 (1966) for a period
= Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 373, 167 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1969).
29 See note 11 supra.
30 275 N.C. at 373, 167 S.E.2d at 763.
"
1Record at 19, Hicks v. Hicks, 4 N.C. App. 28, 165 S.E.2d 681 (1969) (em-
phasis added).
" "The general rule is that the commission of adultery by one of the spouses
justifies the other in leaving, or in remaining away from, the matrimonial dom-
icile .... ." 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 56(4) (1959).
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of one year next preceding the filing of the complaint. A recognized
defense to divorce under section 50-6 is that the separation was brought
about by the plaintiff's willful abandonment.3 3 The burden of proof on
this latter issue was upon the defendant wife, 4 and she presented evi-
dence to the effect that she had been abandoned. The husband sought
to testify, as rebuttal to his wife's defense, that he felt justified in leaving
upon finding her in the act of adultery. This testimony was also ruled
incompetent for purposes of such rebuttal.
The policy of the statute by which the testimony was excluded would
not have been violated if such testimony were ruled admissible in either
of the above two instances. As a successful defense, the testimony would
have defeated the wife's cross action based on abandonment. Collusion
cannot succeed without a prevailing party. If the testimony were allowed
as rebuttal to the wife's abandonment defense, and if such testimony were
found as a fact by the jury, the husband would have succeeded in his
divorce action-not on the grounds of adultery, but on the grounds of
separation. It is doubtful that the policy against collusive divorces is
applicable to proceedings under section 50-6,85 for the nature of the statute
presupposes an agreement between the parties to do an act that will
entitle them to divorce. Furthermore, it is self-evident that if the wife
had agreed to divorce on these grounds, she would not have raised the
defense.
In analyzing Biggs v. Biggs,6 a decision in which testimony offered
in a different context was held to violate neither section 8-56 nor section
50-10 Justice Branch said in his opinion in the instant case: "[The] [d] e-
cision in Biggs rested largely on the interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8-56 and upon the reasoning that the public policy against collusion or
the opportunity for collusion in divorce actions was not violated.3 7 The
" O'Brien v. O'Brien, 266 N.C. 502, 504, 146 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1966).
"Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 132, 125 S.E.2d 373, 374 (1962).
" See 1 LEE § 85. Certainly the court would refuse a divorce if it determined
that the parties had colluded to defraud the court by testifying falsely to the fact
of separation or in regard to the residency requirement. However, in Hicks the
"separation" was established, and the issue before the court was whether the plain-
tiff was at fault in bringing it about.
- 253 N.C. 10, 116 S.E.2d 178 (1960).
"'Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 377, 167 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1969) (emphasis
added). Justice Branch continued, "In instant case it would seem that public
policy would also demand that the wife be protected against the absolute defense
of adultery which the husband sought to prove by his own testimony." Id. at 377,
167 S.E.2d at 765 (emphasis added). It is unclear to what public policy Justice
Branch referred in the above-quoted portion of the opinion. Certainly, "the public
1969]
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opinion in Hicks indicates that the court, though appearing to approve
the decision in Biggs and to recognize the policy behind section 8-56 upon
which that decision was based, either overlooked or dismissed the fact
that the policy behind section 50-10 is the same and should be controlling.
The court turned from any discussion of policy, distinguished the two
statutes on the fact that they are worded differently, 8 and rested its
holding upon the quotation from Perkins0 while ignoring completely
the policy that Justice Ruffin found so important to that decision.
The effect of Hicks is that section 50-10 is extended beyond its
policy-oriented base. Such an extension can lead only to future injustice
and underhanded methods of procuring "competent" testimony. The in-
significance of collusion in North Carolina divorce law40 may indicate
the advisability of repeal of both this statute and its counterpart in
section 8-56. At least, Hicks suggests the need for a closer look by both
the legislature and the court.
JAMES LEE DAVIS
Federal Jurisdiction-Federal Court Intervention as Protection
Against Illegal Police Harassment
"I found there's no correlation between a clean-shaven cheek and
morality-and there's no correlation between long hair and immo-
rality."1 The words might well have been those of the district judge
who in the recent case of Wheeler v. Goodnwn2 observed:
Hippies, like more conventional householders, are entitled to the pro-
tection of the constitution, and the court would be remiss if it allowed
policy against collusion or the opportunity for collusion in divorce actions" was not
violated.
Historically, preservation of family harmony has also been an important policy
consideration of the court. There is no indication, however, that this policy has
valid application to the statutory disability under consideration. Certainly, if the
facts are as the husband contended, the parties in Hicks are beyond reconciliation.
275 N.C. at 378, 167 S.E.2d at 766.
s' See text at note 20 supra. The court also relied partially upon Becker v.
Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964), a case presenting a similar factual
situation, in which the testimony was summarily excluded without any discussion of
policy.
,' See note 25 supra.
1NEwswEEK, Sept. 1, 1969, at 22A, quoting Beverly Hills, California, police
chief Joseph Kimble after observing the White Lake, New York, rock festival.2 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (McMillan, J.)
[Vol. 48
